Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1990.
"The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521388702, September.
- Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1985. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521265140, October.
- Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Gomes, Armando R, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armo Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Penn CARESS Working Papers 76ff153ae29996d16c454e473, Penn Economics Department.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
- Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben, 1991.
"Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 453-466, November.
- Ebbe Groes & Torben Tranæs, 1989. "Sequential Bargaining in a Market with One Seller and Two Different Buyers," Discussion Papers 89-22, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991.
"Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
- Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-829, September.
- Peter C. Cramton, 1992.
"Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
- Peter Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Papers of Peter Cramton 92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
- Armando Gomes, 2005. "Multilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(4), pages 1329-1350, July.
- Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
- Westermark, Andreas, 2003. "Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 296-311, May.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Galasso, Alberto, 2010. "Over-confidence may reduce negotiation delay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 716-733, December.
- Harstad, Bård, 2016.
"The market for conservation and other hostages,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
- Bård Harstad, 2011. "The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages," NBER Working Papers 17409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bård Harstad, 2013. "The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages," CESifo Working Paper Series 4296, CESifo.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Working Paper Series 2006:29, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2004.
"Delay in contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1169-1178, October.
- Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Delay in contests [Verzögerung in Konfliktsituationen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-20, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Bester, Helmut & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Delay in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 3784, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Harstad, Bård, 2016.
"The market for conservation and other hostages,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
- Bård Harstad, 2011. "The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages," NBER Working Papers 17409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bård Harstad, 2013. "The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages," CESifo Working Paper Series 4296, CESifo.
- Moller, Marc, 2007. "The timing of contracting with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 484-503, March.
- Wei Zhang & Jingqi Wang & Reza Ahmadi & Sriram Dasu, 2021. "Timing the Price Agreement in High‐Tech Component Procurement," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(11), pages 4105-4120, November.
- Okada, Akira, 2011.
"Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 227-235, September.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2007. "Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application," Discussion Papers 2007-10, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006.
"Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November.
- Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray, 2003. "Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-30, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000235, David K. Levine.
- Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020.
"Why Are There Strikes?,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 929-956.
- Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8620, CESifo.
- Kyung nok Chun & Zachary Schaller & Stergios Skaperdas, 2020. "Why Are There Strikes?," Working Papers 192006, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2010.
"Holdup, search, and inefficiency,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2007. "Holdup, Search and Inefficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-13, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
- Clara Ponsatí, 2004. "Economic Diplomacy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(5), pages 675-691, December.
- Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 1999. "A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-54, October.
- Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 364-379.
- Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992.
"Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
- Peter Cramton & Joseph S. Tracy, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," Papers of Peter Cramton 92aer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 1998. "Externalities and bargaining disagreement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-65, October.
- Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
- Chiu Yu Ko & Duozhe Li, 2020. "Decentralized One‐To‐Many Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1139-1172, August.
- Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2006. "Bargaining and Strategic Discrimination," Working Paper Series 2006:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2023.
"Collective hold-up,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
- Matias Iaryczower & Santiago Oliveros, 2022. "Collective Hold-Up," NBER Working Papers 29984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonas Björnerstedt & Andreas Westermark, 2009. "The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 301-332, August.
- Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.
More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining Externalities Delay;Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:318-338. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.