Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application
Author
Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Okada, Akira, 2011. "Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 227-235, September.
References listed on IDEAS
- Armando Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2005.
"Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 626-667, June.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Gomes, Armando R, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armo Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Penn CARESS Working Papers 76ff153ae29996d16c454e473, Penn Economics Department.
- Montero, Maria, 2002.
"Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel," Discussion Paper 1999-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel," Other publications TiSEM fe9b8d66-a367-44e4-bf72-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
- Akira Okada, 2000. "The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 34-50, March.
- Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010.
"The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1593-1623, September.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2008. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001852, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754423, HAL.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Post-Print halshs-00754423, HAL.
- Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
- Norman, Peter, 2002.
"Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
- Norman,P., 2000. "Legislative bargaining and coalition formation," Working papers 12, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954.
- Winter, Eyal, 1996. "Voting and Vetoing," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 813-823, December.
- Montero, Maria, 2006. "Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 380-397, February.
- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
- Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000.
"A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 73-88, March.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September.
- Armando Gomes, 2005. "Multilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(4), pages 1329-1350, July.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
- Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
- Westermark, Andreas, 2003. "Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 296-311, May.
- L. S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1967.
"Ownership and the Production Function,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 88-111.
- Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1964. "Ownership and the Production Function," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 167, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Akira Okada, 2015.
"Cooperation and Institution in Games,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," Discussion Papers 2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013.
"Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.
- Andrew McLennan & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining," Economics Working Paper Archive 562, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Maria Montero, 2023.
"Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities,"
Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Maria Montero, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Papers 2021-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Other publications TiSEM 125b271e-7a2b-4123-823d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Drouvelis, Michalis & Montero, Maria & Sefton, Martin, 2010.
"Gaining power through enlargement: Strategic foundations and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 274-292, July.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, "undated". "Gaining Power through Enlargement: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 09/30, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2015.
"Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 29-38.
- Tasos Kalandrakis, 2014. "Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model," Wallis Working Papers WP65, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Kim, Chulyoung & Kim, Sang-Hyun & Lee, Jinhyuk & Lee, Joosung, 2022.
"Strategic alliances in a veto game: An experimental study,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
- Chulyoung Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jinhyuk Lee & Joosung Lee, 2021. "Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game: An Experimental Study," Working papers 2021rwp-183, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Sang-Hyun Kim & Chulyoung Kim & Jinhyuk Lee & Joosung Lee, 2022. "Strategic Alliances in a Veto Game: An Experimental Study," Working papers 2022rwp-198, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015.
"Coalition Formation,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Akira Okada, 2014. "The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 953-973, November.
- Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2012. "The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification," Discussion Papers 2012-06, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Montero, Maria, 2017.
"Proportional Payoffs in Legislative Bargaining with Weighted Voting: A Characterization,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 12(3), pages 325-346, October.
- Maria Montero, 2016. "Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization," Discussion Papers 2016-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Akira Okada, 2023. "Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 427-452, February.
- Joosung Lee, 2013. "Bargaining and Buyout," 2013 Papers ple701, Job Market Papers.
- Okada, Akira, 2010. "The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2356-2379, November.
- Maria Montero, 2015. "A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-18, April.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022.
"Costless delay in negotiations,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2015. "Costless Delay in Negotiations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-010/II, Tinbergen Institute.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2015. "Costless delay in negotiations," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
- Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio, 2017.
"Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 293-315.
- Antonio Merlo & Hulya Eraslan, 2009. "Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetics?," 2009 Meeting Papers 279, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2014. "Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic?," Working Papers 14-001, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Hülya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2014. "Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic?," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gomes, Armando, 2022. "Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 463-477.
- Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2007.
"Demand Commitment in Legislative Bargaining,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 847-850, November.
- Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Demand commitment in legislative bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0511005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zapal, Jan, 2020.
"Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
- Jan Zapal, 2014. "Simple Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Spatial Legislative Bargaining," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp515, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:econdp:2007-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fehitjp.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.