Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Ohlsson, Henry, 2011.
"The legacy of the Swedish gift and inheritance tax, 1884–2004,"
European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 539-569, December.
- Ohlsson, Henry, 2007. "The legacy of the Swedish gift and inheritance tax, 1884–2004," Working Paper Series 2007:23, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Ohlsson, Henry, 2009. "The legacy of the Swedish gift and inheritance tax, 1884-2004," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2009:13, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen & Luca Micheletto, 2010.
"Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 1-27, May.
- Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2007. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates," Working Paper Series 2007:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen & Luca Micheletto, 2008. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates," CESifo Working Paper Series 2303, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; externalities; delay;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2006-12-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2006-12-01 (Microeconomics)
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