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Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers

Author

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  • Hendon, Ebbs
  • Tranaes, Torben

Abstract

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. The authors demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability, even as friction becomes negligible. They investigate the relationship between the use of Nash and sequential bargaining. Nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Suggested Citation

  • Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben, 1991. "Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 453-466, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:453-466
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    Cited by:

    1. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2013. "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 3, pages 51-77, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das, 2015. "Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 949-991, November.
    3. Dolgopolov, Arthur & Houser, Daniel & Martinelli, Cesar & Stratmann, Thomas, 2024. "Assignment markets: Theory and experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    4. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," Economic Research Papers 269732, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    5. Kettaneh, Nouna & Berglund, Anders & Wold, Svante, 2005. "PCA and PLS with very large data sets," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 69-85, January.
    6. Ferraty, F. & Vieu, P., 2003. "Curves discrimination: a nonparametric functional approach," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 161-173, October.
    7. Sempere-Monerris, José J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1997007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Harstad, Bård, 2016. "The market for conservation and other hostages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
    9. Matteo Maria GALIZZI, 2006. "Gas thin markets:insights from bargaining and networks models," Departmental Working Papers 2006-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Martens, Harald & Anderssen, Endre & Flatberg, Arnar & Gidskehaug, Lars Halvor & Hoy, Martin & Westad, Frank & Thybo, Anette & Martens, Magni, 2005. "Regression of a data matrix on descriptors of both its rows and of its columns via latent variables: L-PLSR," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 103-123, January.
    11. Mitsutoshi M. Adachi, 1998. "A note on frictions in the Bazaar type bargaining game," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(2), pages 293-304, May.
    12. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    13. Nguyen, Danh V. & Rocke, D.M.David M., 2004. "On partial least squares dimension reduction for microarray-based classification: a simulation study," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 407-425, June.
    14. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 1999. "A note on three-player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 47-54, October.
    15. Ebbe Hendon & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranæs, 1994. "Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 55-77, December.
    16. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Westermark, Andreas, 2009. "Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 318-338, March.
    17. Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das, 2013. "Decentralised Bilateral Trading in a Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1313, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    18. Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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