IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/restud/v54y1987i3p345-364..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Delay in Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Anat R. Admati
  • Motty Perry

Abstract

This paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable. We find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength. Under some specifications of the parameters, delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction. This delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small.

Suggested Citation

  • Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:3:p:345-364.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297563
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:3:p:345-364.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/restud .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.