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Externalities and bargaining disagreement

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  • Chowdhury, Prabal Roy

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  • Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 1998. "Externalities and bargaining disagreement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-65, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:61:y:1998:i:1:p:61-65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-829, September.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
    5. Prabal Ray Chaudhuri, 1997. "Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 335-360.
    6. Joel Sobel & Ichiro Takahashi, 1983. "A Multistage Model of Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(3), pages 411-426.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tarun Kabiraj & Manas Chaudhuri, 1999. "On the welfare analysis of a cross-border merger," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 195-207.

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