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The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Author

Listed:
  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Nikhil Agarwal
  • Parag A. Pathak

Abstract

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

Suggested Citation

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Nikhil Agarwal & Parag A. Pathak, 2017. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3635-3689, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:12:p:3635-89
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151425
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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    1. The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match (AER 2017) in ReplicationWiki

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