IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v110y2017icp394-402.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Anatolitis, Vasilios
  • Welisch, Marijke

Abstract

The following analysis looks into auctions for renewable energy, specifically onshore wind power in Germany. Following an agent-based modeling approach, the two most commonly applied auction pricing rules are compared (uniform and pay-as-bid) and first conclusions on outcomes are drawn for future policy design. The auctions are modeled to closely represent the auction design foreseen in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, 2017) and replicate their parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Anatolitis, Vasilios & Welisch, Marijke, 2017. "Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 394-402.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:110:y:2017:i:c:p:394-402
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421517305189
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.024?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    2. Natalia Fabra & Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing Electricity Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, Spring.
    3. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    4. Li, Gong & Shi, Jing, 2012. "Agent-based modeling for trading wind power with uncertainty in the day-ahead wholesale electricity markets of single-sided auctions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 13-22.
    5. Kreiss, Jan & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Haufe, Marie-Christin, 2017. "Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support – Prequalifications and penalties," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 512-520.
    6. Widergren, S. & Sun, Junjie & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2006. "Market design test environments," ISU General Staff Papers 200601010800001042, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    7. Iychettira, Kaveri K. & Hakvoort, Rudi A. & Linares, Pedro & de Jeu, Rob, 2017. "Towards a comprehensive policy for electricity from renewable energy: Designing for social welfare," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 228-242.
    8. Weidlich, Anke & Veit, Daniel, 2008. "A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1728-1759, July.
    9. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    10. Luiz T. A. Maurer & Luiz A. Barroso, 2011. "Electricity Auctions : An Overview of Efficient Practices," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2346.
    11. del Río, Pablo & Linares, Pedro, 2014. "Back to the future? Rethinking auctions for renewable electricity support," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 42-56.
    12. Derek W. Bunn and Fernando Oliveira, 2001. "An Application of Agent-based Simulation to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements of England and Wales," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 93, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, September.
    14. Veit, Daniel J. & Weidlich, Anke & Krafft, Jacob A., 2009. "An agent-based analysis of the German electricity market with transmission capacity constraints," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 4132-4144, October.
    15. Atakelty Hailu & Steven Schilizzi, 2004. "Are Auctions More Efficient Than Fixed Price Schemes When Bidders Learn?," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 29(2), pages 147-168, December.
    16. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bichler, Martin & Grimm, Veronika & Kretschmer, Sandra & Sutterer, Paul, 2020. "Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    2. Bishop Ratz, Heidi & Cleary, Kathryne, 2021. "Experience with Competitive Procurements and Centralized Resource Planning to Advance Clean Electricity," RFF Working Paper Series 21-01, Resources for the Future.
    3. Reinhard Madlener & Barbara Glensk & Lukas Gläsel, 2019. "Optimal Timing of Onshore Wind Repowering in Germany under Policy Regime Changes: A Real Options Analysis," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(24), pages 1-33, December.
    4. Niamir, Leila & Filatova, Tatiana & Voinov, Alexey & Bressers, Hans, 2018. "Transition to low-carbon economy: Assessing cumulative impacts of individual behavioral changes," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 325-345.
    5. Leila Niamir & Gregor Kiesewetter & Fabian Wagner & Wolfgang Schöpp & Tatiana Filatova & Alexey Voinov & Hans Bressers, 2020. "Assessing the macroeconomic impacts of individual behavioral changes on carbon emissions," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 158(2), pages 141-160, January.
    6. Matthäus, David, 2020. "Designing effective auctions for renewable energy support," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    7. Enikő Kácsor, 2021. "Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-32, January.
    8. Geßner, Daniel, 2023. "Performance of Renewable Energy Policies - Evidence from Germany's Transition to Auctions," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 105, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Bose, A.S. & Sarkar, S., 2019. "India's e-reverse auctions (2017–2018) for allocating renewable energy capacity: An evaluation," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 762-774.
    10. Kell, Nicholas P. & van der Weijde, Adriaan Hendrik & Li, Liang & Santibanez-Borda, Ernesto & Pillai, Ajit C., 2023. "Simulating offshore wind contract for difference auctions to prepare bid strategies," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 334(C).
    11. Batz Liñeiro, Taimyra & Müsgens, Felix, 2021. "Evaluating the German PV auction program: The secrets of individual bids revealed," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    12. Kitzing, Lena & Siddique, Muhammad Bilal & Nygaard, Ivan & Kruger, Wikus, 2022. "Worth the wait: How South Africa's renewable energy auctions perform compared to Europe's leading countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    13. Eduardo Vicente Mendoza Merch n & Mois s David Vel squez Guti rrez & Diego Armando Medina Montenegro & Jos Ricardo Nu ez Alvarez & John William Grimaldo Guerrero, 2020. "An Analysis of Electricity Generation with Renewable Resources in Germany," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 10(5), pages 361-367.
    14. Stetter, Chris & Piel, Jan-Hendrik & Hamann, Julian F.H. & Breitner, Michael H., 2020. "Competitive and risk-adequate auction bids for onshore wind projects in Germany," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    15. Lundberg, Liv, 2019. "Auctions for all? Reviewing the German wind power auctions in 2017," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 449-458.
    16. Carrosio, Giovanni & Scotti, Ivano, 2019. "The ‘patchy’ spread of renewables: A socio-territorial perspective on the energy transition process," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 684-692.
    17. Welisch, Marijke, 2019. "Multi-unit renewables auctions for small markets - Designing the Danish multi-technology auction scheme," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 372-380.
    18. Qunwei Wang & Cheng Cheng & Dequn Zhou, 2020. "Multi-round auctions in an emissions trading system considering firm bidding strategies and government regulations," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 25(7), pages 1403-1421, October.
    19. Anatolitis, Vasilios & Azanbayev, Alina & Fleck, Ann-Katrin, 2022. "How to design efficient renewable energy auctions? Empirical insights from Europe," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    20. Sheykhha, Siamak & Borggrefe, Frieder & Madlener, Reinhard, 2022. "Policy implications of spatially differentiated renewable energy promotion: A multi-level scenario analysis of onshore wind auctioning in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    21. Hansen, Kenneth & Mathiesen, Brian Vad & Skov, Iva Ridjan, 2019. "Full energy system transition towards 100% renewable energy in Germany in 2050," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 1-13.
    22. Taimyra Batz Li~neiro & Felix Musgens, 2021. "Lessons Learned from Photovoltaic Auctions in Germany," Papers 2104.07536, arXiv.org.
    23. Shyekhha, Siamak & Borggrefe, Frieder & Madlener, Reinhard, 2019. "A Counterfactual Analysis of Regional Renewable Energy Auctions Taking the Spatial Dimension into Account," FCN Working Papers 22/2019, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN).
    24. Le Lan & Md Sayed Iftekhar & James Fogarty & Steven Schilizzi, 2021. "Auctions for buying back groundwater for environmental purposes: Which design performs better?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 931-948, September.
    25. Croonenbroeck, Carsten & Hennecke, David, 2020. "Does the German renewable energy act provide a fair incentive system for onshore wind power? — A simulation analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 58(197), pages 47-78, April – J.
    2. Bichler, Martin & Grimm, Veronika & Kretschmer, Sandra & Sutterer, Paul, 2020. "Market design for renewable energy auctions: An analysis of alternative auction formats," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    3. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.
    4. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    5. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    6. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2020. "A Universal Dynamic Auction for Unimodular Demand Types: An Efficient Auction Design for Various Kinds of Indivisible Commodities," Discussion Papers 20/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.
    8. Li, Zhen & Kuo, Ching-Chung, 2011. "Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 721-729, December.
    9. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 422-466.
    10. Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023. "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers 202310, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    11. Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    12. Alessandra Casella & Adam B. Cox, 2018. "A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(S1), pages 195-227.
    13. Sweeting, Andrew & Bhattacharya, Vivek, 2015. "Selective entry and auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 189-207.
    14. Bayer, Benjamin & Berthold, Lennart & Moreno Rodrigo de Freitas, Bruno, 2018. "The Brazilian experience with auctions for wind power: An assessment of project delays and potential mitigation measures," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 97-117.
    15. Li, Yunan, 2017. "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 225-253.
    16. Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras, 2015. "Nuclear Capacity Auctions," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    17. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2010. "The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 209-226, December.
    18. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2017. "Allocating essential inputs," TSE Working Papers 17-820, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2019.
    19. Grashof, Katherina & Berkhout, Volker & Cernusko, Robert & Pfennig, Maximilian, 2020. "Long on promises, short on delivery? Insights from the first two years of onshore wind auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    20. Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:110:y:2017:i:c:p:394-402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.