Research on defense strategies for power system frequency stability under false data injection attacks

The rapid development of cyber-physical power system has highlighted the pressing issue of cyber attacks (CAs) faced by large-scale renewable energy power systems (LREPS). The injection of false data attacks on critical electrical equipment by attackers can lead to abnormal system frequencies, triggering cascade failures and causing widespread blackouts. This paper introduces a tri-level defense model specifically crafted for LREPS, comprising an upper, middle, and lower level (defender-attacker-operator). By promoting collaborative decision-making among these agents, the model aims to mitigate the rate of change of frequency (RoCoF) and effectively withstand CAs. The upper-level employs an economic-inertia optimization strategy, scheduling generator units to maximize system inertia while minimizing generation costs. By leveraging the strong duality theorem, the tri-level model is decomposed into a bi-level model consisting of a master problem and a subproblem, solved using the Benders decomposition method. Furthermore, this paper also considers augmenting the virtual inertia of renewable energy units when defense resources are insufficient, ensuring RoCoF remains within limits after CAs. The effectiveness and superiority of the proposed model and strategy are validated through case studies based on the improved IEEE 118-bus system. The results demonstrate that the model can reduce load shedding caused by the worst-case CAs, enhance system inertia, lower RoCoF, and improve the stability of LREPS.