Resilience-oriented defense strategy for power systems against uncertain malicious coordinated attacks

The development of cyber-physical power system (CPPS) will provide potential solutions for the high efficiency and intelligent requirements of traditional power systems. However, the uncertainty of malicious attacks brings a great threat to the normal operation of the CPPS. In order to enhance the resilience of CPPS against uncertain malicious coordinated attacks, a resilience-oriented defense strategy is proposed considering attack scenario uncertainties. Firstly, an uncertain coordinated attack strategy against generation units and transmission lines is constructed based on dynamic N-k breaking scheme to describe a more harmful attack mechanism against power systems. Secondly, considering the uncertain malicious coordinated attacks, a tri-level defense model is proposed in the framework of defender-attacker-defender. Finally, the proposed model is transformed into mixed integer linear programming model by using duality theory, and a constraint-generation and benders-cut (CG&BC) algorithm is developed to solve the defense model. The model is simulated and verified on the IEEE RTS-79 test system, and the results fully validate the effectiveness of the model and solution algorithm, and show that the resilience-oriented defense strategy can effectively reduce the total expected cost of power systems against uncertain malicious coordinated attacks.