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Gender Differences In Motivational Crowding Out Of Work Performance

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  • Volker Benndorf
  • Holger A. Rau
  • Christian Sölch

Abstract

This paper shows that prior financial incentives induce a crowding‐out effect when incentives are discontinued. In our real‐effort experiment workers receive a piece rate before monetary incentives are substituted by a one‐time payment. In this case, workers' performance significantly drops when receiving the one‐time payment. The effect is driven by a fraction of men who reduce effort substantially, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding‐out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard several alternative explanations besides motivational crowding out. (JEL C91, J16, M54)

Suggested Citation

  • Volker Benndorf & Holger A. Rau & Christian Sölch, 2019. "Gender Differences In Motivational Crowding Out Of Work Performance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 206-226, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:1:p:206-226
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12718
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    4. Hoffmann, Christin & Hoppe, Julia Amelie & Ziemann, Niklas, 2022. "Faster, harder, greener? Empirical evidence on the role of the individual Pace of Life for productivity and pro-environmental behavior," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    5. Benndorf, Volker & Rau, Holger A. & Sölch, Christian, 2019. "Minimizing learning in repeated real-effort tasks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 239-248.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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