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Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence

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  • John Conlisk

Abstract

An evolutionary game model shows how an equilibrium distribution of competence may evolve when members of a population prey on one another, but when predatory competence is costly to acquire. Under one interpretation, the competence distribution is an endogenously determined distribution of bounded rationality. An example shows how "tricksters" and "suckers" might coexist in the long run. The analysis leads to a curious result about a mixed equilibrium for a symmetric, zero-sum game. An increase in the costs of one or more competence levels has exactly zero effect on the fraction of the population at those levels.

Suggested Citation

  • John Conlisk, 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 475-484, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:3:p:475-484
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.3.475
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    2. Golman, Russell & Page, Scott E., 2010. "Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 359-376, March.
    3. Antoci, Angelo & Gay, Antonio & Landi, Massimiliano & Sacco, Pier Luigi, 2008. "Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 3877-3894, December.
    4. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
    5. Angelo Antoci & Massimiliano Landi, 2006. "Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22057, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    6. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    7. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
    8. Huck, Nicolas & Mavoori, Hareesh & Mesly, Olivier, 2020. "The rationality of irrationality in times of financial crises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 337-350.
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    11. Mesly, Olivier & Chkir, Imed & Racicot, François-Éric, 2019. "Predatory cells and puzzling financial crises: Are toxic products good for the financial markets?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 11-31.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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