Adaptation in games : Two solutions to the Crawford puzzle
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Cited by:
- Dawid, Herbert, 1997. "Learning of equilibria by a population with minimal information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Nax, Heinrich Harald & Newton, Jonathan, 2022. "Deep and shallow thinking in the long run," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
- Tang, Fang-Fang, 2001. "Anticipatory learning in two-person games: some experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-232, February.
- Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Sanders, James & Galla, Tobias, 2017. "A taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2017-06, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
- Conlisk, John, 2005. "Endogenous rationality and distributions of competence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 471-487, April.
- Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Heinrich, Torsten, "undated".
"Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games,"
INET Oxford Working Papers
2017-07, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, revised Mar 2018.
- Marco Pangallo & Torsten Heinrich & J Doyne Farmer, 2017. "Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games," Papers 1704.05276, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2018.
- Pangallo, Marco & Sanders, James B.T. & Galla, Tobias & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2022.
"Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1-21.
- Marco Pangallo & James Sanders & Tobias Galla & Doyne Farmer, 2017. "Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 x 2 games," Papers 1701.09043, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
- John Conlisk, 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 475-484, June.
- Iriberri, Nagore & GarcÃa-Pola, Bernardo, 2019. "Naivete and Sophistication in Initial and Repeated Play in Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 14088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tone Dieckmann, 1998. "Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 187-212, September.
- Georgios Chasparis & Jeff Shamma, 2012. "Distributed Dynamic Reinforcement of Efficient Outcomes in Multiagent Coordination and Network Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 18-50, March.
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