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Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics

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  • Massimiliano Landi

    (SMU)

Abstract

We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategies population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimiliano Landi, 2007. "Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics," Development Economics Working Papers 22463, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:eab:develo:22463
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Pedro, de Mendonça, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications," MPRA Paper 17889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Oyama, Daisuke, 2009. "Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 696-713, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary games; dynamic systems; bounded rationality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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