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Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world

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  • Chan, Kenneth S.
  • Laffargue, Jean-Pierre

Abstract

We develop a dynamic game between an attacker and a defender country to investigate the effects of persistent war on the growth of nations in a Malthusian regime, under costly plunder and defense. We compute the stage-wise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, which depends on the relative military efficiency of defense and the time horizons of the sovereigns. Then, we compare this equilibrium to the one when the defender country can offer to buy peace with a tribute.

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  • Chan, Kenneth S. & Laffargue, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 138-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:84:y:2016:i:c:p:138-150
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.10.005
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    Cited by:

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    2. María Cubel & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2020. "Property Out of Conflict: A Survey and Some New Results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 891-927.

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