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Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game

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  • Crawford, Vincent P

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  • Crawford, Vincent P, 1974. "Learning the Optimal Strategy in a Zero-Sum Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(5), pages 885-891, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:42:y:1974:i:5:p:885-91
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    Cited by:

    1. Dawid, Herbert, 1997. "Learning of equilibria by a population with minimal information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Nax, Heinrich Harald & Newton, Jonathan, 2022. "Deep and shallow thinking in the long run," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    3. Kashyap, Ravi, 2020. "David vs Goliath (You against the Markets), A dynamic programming approach to separate the impact and timing of trading costs," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 545(C).
    4. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 2007. "Participation games: Market entry, coordination, and the beautiful blonde," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 120-137, May.
    5. Tang, Fang-Fang, 2001. "Anticipatory learning in two-person games: some experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-232, February.
    6. Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Sanders, James & Galla, Tobias, 2017. "A taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2017-06, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    7. Conlisk, John, 2005. "Endogenous rationality and distributions of competence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 471-487, April.
    8. Pangallo, Marco & Farmer, J. Doyne & Heinrich, Torsten, "undated". "Best reply structure and equilibrium convergence in generic games," INET Oxford Working Papers 2017-07, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, revised Mar 2018.
    9. Pangallo, Marco & Sanders, James B.T. & Galla, Tobias & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2022. "Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1-21.
    10. John Conlisk, 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 475-484, June.
    11. Echenique, Federico & Edlin, Aaron, 2004. "Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 61-79, September.
    12. Dahl, F.A., 2005. "The lagging anchor model for game learning--a solution to the Crawford puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 287-303, July.
    13. Tone Dieckmann, 1998. "Stochastic Learning and the Evolution of Conventions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 187-212, September.

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