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The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis

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  • Chang, Yang-Ming
  • Sanders, Shane
  • Walia, Bhavneet

Abstract

In models of (destructive) armed conflict, it is standard to account for the endogeneity of arming allocations made by incumbent government and rebel parties. Indeed, standard contest-theoretic (microeconomic) models of behavior recognize that allocations change with shifts in marginal benefit or marginal cost. Taking governments and rebels as responsive to such shifts, the present study applies standard, contest-theoretic, equilibrium analysis to the Smith et al. (2014) model of conflict and cooperation. This alternative solution methodology yields starkly different results. Within the present analysis, there does not exist greater scope for cooperation given endogenously-destructive arming rather than exogenously-destructive arming.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang, Yang-Ming & Sanders, Shane & Walia, Bhavneet, 2015. "The costs of conflict: A choice-theoretic, equilibrium analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-65.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:131:y:2015:i:c:p:62-65
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.03.025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Auger & Yang-Ming Chang & Shane Sanders, 2017. "Do Humanitarian Interventions Help Humanity? An Economic Analysis of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Norm in Intrastate Conflicts," Journal of Development Innovations, KarmaQuest International, vol. 1(2), pages 1-14, October.
    2. Yang-Ming Chang & Manaf Sellak, 2019. "A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 209-228, June.
    3. Dong, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016. "A sequential game of endowment effect and natural property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 108-111.
    4. Yang‐Ming Chang & Shih‐Jye Wu, 2020. "Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(4), pages 1338-1371, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Armed conflict; Settlement; Destruction; Equilibrium analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

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