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Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

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  • Asheim, Geir B.

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  • Asheim, Geir B., 1991. "Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:278-294
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    Cited by:

    1. Osterdal, Lars Peter, 2005. "Bargaining power in repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 101-110, January.
    2. Xue, Licun, 2002. "Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 165-176, March.
    3. Caillaud, B. & Cohen, D., 2000. "Inter-generational transfers and common values in a society," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1091-1103, May.
    4. Geir B. Asheim, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 427-443.
    5. Ferreira, Jos e Luis, 1996. "A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 249-257, January.
    6. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
    7. Mikhail Safronov & Bruno Strulovici, 2014. "Explicit Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1575, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society.
    9. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
    10. Geir Asheim & Jon Strand, 1991. "Long-term union-firm contracts," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 161-184, June.
    11. Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1225, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    12. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    13. Houba, H., 1992. "Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts," Serie Research Memoranda 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    14. Harstad, Bård, 2016. "The market for conservation and other hostages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 124-151.
    15. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
    16. Baliga, Sandeep & Evans, Robert, 2000. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 159-176, November.
    17. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Andersson Ola & Wengström Erik, 2010. "Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
    19. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2023. "An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 530-561.
    20. repec:cte:derepe:3363 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Justifiable punishments in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 16-28.
    22. Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian, 2017. "Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 12540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
    24. Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.
    25. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Blonski, Matthias, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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