Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule
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- Matzke, Christina & Wirth, Benedikt, 2008. "A non-standard approach to a market with boundedly rational consumers and strategic firms. Part I: A microfoundation for the evolution of sales," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 10/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Zhao, Xiaojian, 2011.
"Framing contingencies in contracts,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 31-40, January.
- Xiaojian ZHAO, 2008. "Framing Contingencies in Contracts," EcoMod2008 23800158, EcoMod.
- Norton, Benjamin P. & Hoel, Jessica B. & Michelson, Hope, 2020. "The demand for (fake?) fertilizer: Using an experimental auction to examine the role of beliefs on agricultural input demand in Tanzania," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304444, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Ran Spiegler, 2006.
"The Market for Quacks,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 1113-1131.
- Rani Spiegler, 2005. "The Market for Quacks," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000634, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Matzke, Christina & Wirth, Benedikt, 2009. "Product Pricing when Demand Follows a Rule of Thumb," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2009, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Francois, P. & Zabojnik, J., 2001.
"Culture and Development : An Analytical Framework,"
Discussion Paper
2001-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Francois, P. & Zabojnik, J., 2001. "Culture and Development : An Analytical Framework," Other publications TiSEM 1685c9e0-b3c0-438f-9f2e-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hoffler, Felix, 1999. "Some play fair, some don't: Reciprocal fairness in a stylized principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 113-131, January.
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