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Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship

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  • Holden Steinar

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  • Holden Steinar, 1994. "Bargaining and Commitment in a Permanent Relationship," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 169-176, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:169-176
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Manzini, Paola, 1997. "Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 15-22, January.
    3. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
    4. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015. "Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1744-1751.
    5. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2012. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions," Post-Print halshs-00674033, HAL.
    6. repec:hal:pseose:hal-01241273 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    8. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Inefficient equilibria and lockouts in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print halshs-01113240, HAL.
    9. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2009. "A Critical Review of Strategic Conflict Theory and Socio-political Instability Models," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 119(6), pages 817-858.
    10. Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under different strike decisions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00975533, HAL.

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