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Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies

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  • Weber R. J.

Abstract

Herein we present a single example with three purposes: (1) to show the existence of equilibria in a game which violates the assumptions of currently-available general existence theorems, (2) to illustrate the importance of the "affiliation" assumption in economic games of incomplete information, by showing how even a slight relaxation can lead to the nonexistence of equilibria in monotone strategies, and, most importantly, (3) to exhibit an equilibrium point in strategies which partially reveal information without inducing posterior partitionings of the players' type spaces.
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Suggested Citation

  • Weber R. J., 1994. "Equilibrium in Non-partitioning Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 286-294, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:286-294
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-872, July.
    2. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    3. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Topologies on Information and Strategies in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 463, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
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