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Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information

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  • Sandholm, William H.

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  • Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:343-378
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    2. Alan Beggs, 2002. "Stochastic evolution with slow learning," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 379-405.
    3. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
    4. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    5. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 107-116.
    6. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    7. Valentina Corradi & Rajiv Sarin, "undated". "Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," ELSE working papers 002, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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    9. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
    10. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-867, May.
    11. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    12. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
    13. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
    14. Boylan Richard T., 1995. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 615-625, August.
    15. Corradi, Valentina & Sarin, Rajiv, 2000. "Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 163-191, October.
    16. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
    17. Cabrales, Antonio, 2000. "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 451-481, May.
    18. Binmore Kenneth G. & Samuelson Larry & Vaughan Richard, 1995. "Musical Chairs: Modeling Noisy Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, October.
    19. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
    20. Sandholm, William H. & Pauzner, Ady, 1998. "Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 84-120, January.
    21. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift And Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 049, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonas Hedlund & Carlos Oyarzun, 2018. "Imitation in heterogeneous populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 937-973, June.
    2. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
    3. Hofbauer, Josef & Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 2009. "Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 406-429, March.
    4. Lahkar, Ratul & Sandholm, William H., 2008. "The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 565-590, November.
    5. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    6. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    7. Iryo, Takamasa & Watling, David, 2019. "Properties of equilibria in transport problems with complex interactions between users," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 87-114.
    8. Pietro Dindo & Jan Tuinstra, 2011. "A Class of Evolutionary Models for Participation Games with Negative Feedback," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 37(3), pages 267-300, March.
    9. Dorofeenko Victor & Shorish Jamsheed, 2006. "Finite Memory Distributed Systems," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, December.
    10. Iryo, Takamasa, 2019. "Instability of departure time choice problem: A case with replicator dynamics," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 353-364.
    11. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Sandholm, William H., 2019. "An introduction to ABED: Agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 434-462.
    12. Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Potential dynamics and stable games," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    13. , & Lorenz, Jan & ,, 2016. "Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    14. Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 149-170, October.
    15. Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Sayan & Roy, Souvik, 2023. "The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: A deterministic approximation approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 133-160.
    16. Iryo, Takamasa, 2016. "Day-to-day dynamical model incorporating an explicit description of individuals’ information collection behaviour," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 92(PA), pages 88-103.
    17. Tanabe, Yasuo, 2006. "The propagation of chaos for interacting individuals in a large population," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 125-152, March.
    18. Sandholm, William H. & DokumacI, Emin & Lahkar, Ratul, 2008. "The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 666-683, November.
    19. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    20. Yang, Fan & Zhang, Ding, 2009. "Day-to-day stationary link flow pattern," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 119-126, January.
    21. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Stable games and their dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1665-1693.4, July.
    22. Ratul Lahkar & Sayan Mukherjee & Souvik Roy, 2022. "A Deterministic Approximation Approach to the Continuum Logit Dynamic with an Application to Supermodular Games," Working Papers 79, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.

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