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Regret-based continuous-time dynamics

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  • Hart, Sergiu
  • Mas-Colell, Andreu

Abstract

Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play. Here we carry out the corresponding analysis in continuous time. We observe that, in contrast to (smooth) fictitious play or to evolutionary models, the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the product of their mixed action spaces). We obtain relatively simple proofs for some results known in the discrete case (related to “no-regret” and correlated equilibria), and also a new result on two-person potential games (for this result we also provide a discrete-time proof).
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Suggested Citation

  • Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2003. "Regret-based continuous-time dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 375-394, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:375-394
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    1. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 3, pages 47-76, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
    3. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
    4. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading To Correlated Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 2, pages 17-46, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
    6. Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Potential dynamics and stable games," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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