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Persistent retracts and preparation

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  • Voorneveld, Mark

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  • Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Persistent retracts and preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 228-232, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:51:y:2005:i:1:p:228-232
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    1. Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1990. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521388702, January.
    2. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
    3. Blume, Lawrence E & Zame, William R, 1994. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 783-794, July.
    4. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tercieux, O.R.C. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "The Cutting Power of Preparation," Other publications TiSEM 75173341-627f-4eb2-91f1-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Kets, W., 2008. "Networks and learning in game theory," Other publications TiSEM 7713fce1-3131-498c-8c6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Learning to be Prepared," Discussion Paper 2005-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Gilles Grandjean & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2017. "Strongly rational sets for normal-form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 35-46, April.
    5. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2015. "The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 165-193, February.
    6. Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2006. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 153-153, April.
    7. Peter Wikman, 2022. "Nash blocks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 29-51, March.
    8. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.
    9. John Duggan & Michel Le Breton, 2014. "Choice-theoretic Solutions for Strategic Form Games," RCER Working Papers 580, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    10. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.

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