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A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices

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Cited by:

  1. Gordon Tullock, 1977. "The demand-revealing process as a welfare indicator," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 51-63, March.
  2. Beatrice Cherrier & Jean-Baptiste Fleury, 2017. "Economists’ interest in collective decision after World War II: a history," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 23-44, July.
  3. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
  4. A. H. Barnett, 1981. "Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods," Public Finance Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 221-234, April.
  5. Earl Brubaker, 1983. "On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 315-319, January.
  6. Moritz Drexl & Andreas Kleiner, 2018. "Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 253-271, August.
  7. Robert Bordley, 1985. "Using factions to estimate preference intensity: Improving upon one person/one vote," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 257-268, January.
  8. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2014. "Efficient voting with penalties," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 1419, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  9. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 45-73, July.
  10. Sarkar, Soumendu, 2018. "Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 37-46.
  11. JOHN McMILLAN, 1979. "The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(2), pages 95-107, June.
  12. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 109-130, October.
  13. Holcombe, Randall G. (Холкомб, Рэндалл Дж.), 2015. "A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods [Теория Происхождения Теории Общественных Благ]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 196-207.
  14. T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2015. "Remembering Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 235-238, March.
  15. R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton & Svetlana Pevnitskaya, 2019. "A new experimental mechanism to investigate polarized demands for public goods: the effects of censoring," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 585-609, September.
  16. Don Coursey & William Schulze, 1986. "The application of laboratory experimental economics to the contingent valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 47-68, January.
  17. Steven Johnson, 1984. "Demand-revealing processes and accounting standard-setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 3-24, January.
  18. Michael Munger, 2012. "Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 61-72, July.
  19. T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2008. "Paying the partners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 19-37, July.
  20. T. Tideman, 1983. "An experiment in the demand-revealing process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 387-401, January.
  21. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
  22. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2008. "Accurate Valuation in the Absence of Markets," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(3), pages 334-358, May.
  23. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 47-60, July.
  24. Janet T. Landa, 2016. "“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock, the man and the bioeconomist," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 129-136, July.
  25. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2012. "Qualitative voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 526-554, October.
  26. Robert Axelrod, 1980. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 3-25, March.
  27. A. Hamlin, 1984. "Constitutional control of processes and their outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 133-145, January.
  28. Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
  29. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
  30. Matt Essen, 2014. "A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 309-327, August.
  31. Nabamita Dutta & Russell Sobel, 2016. "Does corruption ever help entrepreneurship?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 179-199, June.
  32. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2010. "Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 455-470, March.
  33. Randall G. Holcombe & Paul C. Taylor, 1980. "Tax Referenda and the Voluntary Exchange Model of Taxation: a Suggested Implementation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 8(1), pages 107-114, January.
  34. Pham, Hai-Vu, 2010. "La dimension conflictuelle des projets d’infrastructure : essais sur la décision publique, le contentieux et les prix immobiliers," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5656 edited by Torre, André & Kirat, Thierry.
  35. Richard Wallick, 2012. "Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 223-244, July.
  36. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
  37. Charles Laine, 1985. "Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 437-457, January.
  38. McKitrick, Ross & Collinge, Robert A., 2002. "The Existence and Uniqueness of Optimal Pollution Policy in the Presence of Victim Defense Measures," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 106-122, July.
  39. Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny, 2007. "Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 197-215, April.
  40. Edward Bierhanzl & Paul Downing, 1998. "User charges and bureaucratic inefficiency," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(2), pages 175-189, June.
  41. Roy D. Adams & Ken McCormick, 1993. "The Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Needs to Be Expanded, Not Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 109-116, January.
  42. Kwiek, Maksymilian, 2017. "Efficient voting with penalties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 468-485.
  43. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
  44. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
  45. Martin Gaynor, 1989. "The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 261-267, June.
  46. Arthur Schram & Frans Winden, 1989. "Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 259-282, March.
  47. David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, 2017. "Gordon Tullock’s ill-fated appendix: “Flatland Revisited”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 18-34, March.
  48. Bryane Michael, 2005. "The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes," Microeconomics 0511009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Gaël Giraud, 2004. "The limit-price exchange process," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04118, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  50. Dennis Mueller, 2012. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 329-332, September.
  51. Eli Noam, 1982. "Demand functions and the valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 271-280, January.
  52. Steven Lalley & Glen Weyl, 2015. "Quadratic Voting," Working Papers 2016-13, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  53. John G. Head, 1977. "Public Goods:The Polar Case Reconsidered," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 53(2), pages 227-238, June.
  54. T. Tideman & Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Coalitions under demand revealing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 323-328, January.
  55. Becker, Nir & Shechter, Mordechai, 1996. "Decentralized economic incentives under technological indivisibilities: a cooperative game approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 9-20, April.
  56. Yang, Der-Yuan, 1997. "A Mechanism for Allocating the Expenses of Public Goods: Analyses of a Swedish Government Project," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt3mx5z1b4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  57. Tullock Gordon, 1995. "More Impossibility," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2-3), pages 243-258, June.
  58. Matt Van Essen, 2013. "Making efficient public good decisions using an augmented Ausubel auction," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(1), pages 57-68, May.
  59. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "Quadratic voting and the public good: introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 1-22, July.
  60. Csontos, László, 1997. "A politika tanulmányozása és a közgazdaságtan [The study of politics and political economy]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 557-568.
  61. William Mitchell, 1988. "Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 101-119, February.
  62. Patrick Welle, 1999. "Public policy and the quality of life: How relevant is economics? Public policy and the quality of life: Market incentives versus government planning Randall G. Holcombe greenwood press, 1995, 190 pp," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 91-113, March.
  63. William Keech & Michael Munger, 2015. "The anatomy of government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 1-42, July.
  64. Edward Clarke, 1980. "Incentives in public decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 379-382, January.
  65. Rafael Hortalà-Vallvé, 2010. "Qualitative Voting," Cuadernos de Economía - Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance, Asociación Cuadernos de Economía, vol. 33(92), pages 5-44, Mayo-Sept.
  66. Howard Margolis, 1982. "A thought experiment on demand-revealing mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 87-91, March.
  67. Arthur Schram, 2016. "Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 214-226, June.
  68. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
  69. Gehring, Kai, 2013. "Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 74-90.
  70. Randall G. Holcombe, 2023. "The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 157-167, July.
  71. Kangas, Annika & Laukkanen, Sanna & Kangas, Jyrki, 2006. "Social choice theory and its applications in sustainable forest management--a review," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 77-92, November.
  72. Howard Margolis, 1983. "A note on demand-revealing," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 217-225, January.
  73. Sebastian Coll, 2008. "The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 313-355, December.
  74. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 1996. "A Revelation Approach To Optimal Taxation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 24(4), pages 439-463, October.
  75. Gary Miller & Thomas Hammond, 1994. "Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(1), pages 5-26, January.
  76. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
  77. Timur Kuran, 1987. "Chameleon voters and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 53-78, January.
  78. E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "The robustness of quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 75-107, July.
  79. Timo Hoffmann & Sander Renes, 2022. "Flip a coin or vote? An experiment on the implementation and efficiency of social choice mechanisms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(2), pages 624-655, April.
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