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The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey

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  • JOHN McMILLAN

Abstract

A number of recent papers have developed a variety of ways of overcoming the free‐rider problem. This essay presents a survey and exposition of these contributions and suggests that the free‐rider problem is a statement of the incompleteness of the standard theory rather than a description of the world. Misallocation of resources is not inevitable in a public‐goods economy.

Suggested Citation

  • JOHN McMILLAN, 1979. "The Free‐Rider Problem: A Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(2), pages 95-107, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:55:y:1979:i:2:p:95-107
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1979.tb02209.x
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jesse Malkin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1991. "Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 355-378, October.
    3. Alt, Marius, 2024. "Better us later than me now —," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    4. Margaret A. McKean, 1992. "Success on the Commons," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 247-281, July.

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