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Decentralized economic incentives under technological indivisibilities: a cooperative game approach

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  • Becker, Nir
  • Shechter, Mordechai

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  • Becker, Nir & Shechter, Mordechai, 1996. "Decentralized economic incentives under technological indivisibilities: a cooperative game approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 9-20, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:17:y:1996:i:1:p:9-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Oates, Wallace E, 1983. "The Regulation of Externalities: Efficient Behavior by Sources and Victims," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 38(3), pages 362-375.
    3. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    4. Mordechai Shechter, 1991. "A comparative study of environmental amenity valuations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 1(2), pages 129-155, June.
    5. Tideman, T Nicolaus & Tullock, Gordon, 1976. "A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1145-1159, December.
    6. Tietenberg, T H, 1990. "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 6(1), pages 17-33, Spring.
    7. Nir Becker & Mira Baron & Mordechai Shechter, 1993. "Economic instruments for emission abatement under appreciable technological indivisibilities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(3), pages 263-284, June.
    8. repec:bla:econom:v:50:y:1983:i:200:p:425-37 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Chao-Ning Liao, 2009. "Technology adoption decisions under a mixed regulatory system of tradable permits and air pollution fees for the control of Total Suspended Particulates in Taiwan," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 135-153, April.

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