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Abuse of Authority and Hierarchical Communication

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  1. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  2. Marcel Maurer & Norbert Bach & Simon Oertel, 2023. "Changes in formal structure towards self-managing organization and their effects on the intra-organizational communication network," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 12(3), pages 83-98, September.
  3. Mechtenberg, Lydia & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2020. "Whistleblower protection: Theory and experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
  4. Eberlein, Marion & Przemeck, Judith, 2008. "Whom will you choose? - Collaborator Selection and Selector’s Self-Prediction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  5. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 15-30.
  6. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2016. "Managers, Training, and Internal Labor Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145666, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  7. Kong-Pin Chen, 2005. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
  8. Wagner, Alexander F., 2011. "Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities," CEPR Discussion Papers 8378, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Lee, Sunyoung & Pitesa, Marko & Pillutla, Madan & Thau, Stefan, 2015. "When beauty helps and when it hurts: An organizational context model of attractiveness discrimination in selection decisions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 15-28.
  10. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Earnings Manipilation and Incentives in Firms," Working Papers w0055, New Economic School (NES), revised Oct 2005.
  11. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  12. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Nikolay Zubanov, 2022. "Middle Managers, Personnel Turnover, and Performance: A Long‐Term Field Experiment in a Retail Chain," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 211-229, January.
  13. Kim, Doyoung & Lawarree, Jacques & Shin, Dongsoo, 2004. "Exit option in hierarchical agency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1265-1287, November.
  14. Alexander Wagner, 2011. "Loyalty and competence in public agencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 145-162, January.
  15. Kai Riemer & Stefan Stieglitz & Christian Meske, 2015. "From Top to Bottom," Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, Springer;Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), vol. 57(3), pages 197-212, June.
  16. Colin P. Green & John S. Heywood, 2016. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses Just Added on Top of Salaries?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 490-513, July.
  17. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
  18. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2011. "A simple model of favouritism in recruitment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 78-88, June.
  19. Lu-Ming Tseng & Yue-Min Kang, 2015. "Managerial Authority, Turnover Intention and Medical Insurance Claims Adjusters’ Recommendations for Claim Payments," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 40(2), pages 334-352, April.
  20. Emre Ekinci, 2022. "Monetary rewards in employee referral programs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(1), pages 35-58, January.
  21. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
  22. Boyer, Marcel & Robert, Jacques, 2006. "Organizational inertia and dynamic incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 324-348, March.
  23. Uwe Jirjahn & Erik Poutsma, 2013. "The Use of Performance Appraisal Systems: Evidence from Dutch Establishment Data," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 801-828, October.
  24. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "Consumers and Agency Problems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 34-51, March.
  25. Stepanov, Sergey, 2020. "Biased performance evaluation in a model of career concerns: incentives versus ex-post optimality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 589-607.
  26. Canice J. Prendergast, 2001. "Consumers and Agency Problems," NBER Working Papers 8445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. Jingchuan Pu & Yang Liu & Yuan Chen & Liangfei Qiu & Hsing Kenneth Cheng, 2022. "What Questions Are You Inclined to Answer? Effects of Hierarchy in Corporate Q&A Communities," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(1), pages 244-264, March.
  28. Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June.
  29. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  30. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Szafarz, Ariane, 2011. "The modern corporation as a safe haven for taste-based discrimination: An agency model of hiring decisions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 487-497, August.
  31. S. Guriev & G. Egorov & K. Sonin, 2007. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 4.
  32. Pinghan Liang, 2017. "Transfer of authority within hierarchies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(4), pages 273-290, December.
  33. Wang, Peng, 2020. "Superior firm performance under conditional communication between top hierarchy and the subordinates," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 516-526.
  34. Goldlücke, Susanne, 2017. "Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 176-178.
  35. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
  36. Colin Green & John Heywood, 2012. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses and Time Rates Complements?," Working Papers 13424023, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  37. Brilon, Stefanie, 2015. "Job assignment with multivariate skills and the Peter Principle," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 112-121.
  38. Ying Bai & Titi Zhou, 2019. "“Mao’s last revolution”: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 469-500, September.
  39. Sengupta, Sarbajit, 2004. "Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1327-1347, November.
  40. Sarbajit Sengupta, 2002. "Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 810, CESifo.
  41. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
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