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Consumers and Agency Problems

Author

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  • Canice Prendergast

    (University of Chicago and NBER)

Abstract

Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers disagree with principals over desired outcomes, which characterises many public sector benefits, consumers" feedback about the performance of agents can reduce welfare. This may result in efficiently restricting the ability of consumers to complain about agent performance. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002.

Suggested Citation

  • Canice Prendergast, 2002. "Consumers and Agency Problems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 34-51, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:478:p:c34-c51
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-472, June.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    4. Canice Prendergast, 2016. "Bureaucratic Responses," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(S2), pages 183-215.
    5. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2013. "Consumers' Complaints, the Nature of Corruption, and Social Welfare," MPRA Paper 47215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016. "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers 2016/14, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    7. Rachel M. Hayes & Feng Jiang & Yihui Pan, 2021. "Voice of the Customers: Local Trust Culture and Consumer Complaints to the CFPB," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 1077-1121, June.
    8. Amin, Mohammad, 2008. "Competition and demographics," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4514, The World Bank.
    9. O'Malley, Eoin & Scott, Susan & Sorrell, Steve, 2003. "Barriers to Energy Efficiency: Evidence from Selected Sectors," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number PRS47.
    10. Klaus Abbink & Matthew Ellman, 2004. "The donor problem," Economics Working Papers 796, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
    11. Nabanita Datta Gupta & Mette Lausten & Dario Pozzoli, 2018. "Does mother know best? Parental discrepancies in assessing child behavioral and educational outcomes," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 407-425, June.
    12. Miguel Flores & Catherine Waddams Price, 2013. "Consumer behaviour in the British retail electricity market," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    13. Paul A. Pavlou & David Gefen, 2005. "Psychological Contract Violation in Online Marketplaces: Antecedents, Consequences, and Moderating Role," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 16(4), pages 372-399, December.

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