Consumers and Agency Problems
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Prat, Andrea, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Prat, Andrea, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Prat, Andrea, 2003. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Howell, Bronwyn, 2001. "Health Sector Failures in New Zealand: Act of God, Act of Man or Inadequacies in Control Design," Working Paper Series 19000, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- Howell, Bronwyn, 2001. "Health Sector Failures in New Zealand: Act of God, Act of Man or Inadequacies in Control Design," Working Paper Series 3901, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
- repec:vuw:vuwscr:19000 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EEC-2001-08-30 (European Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2001-08-30 (Microeconomics)
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