The Theory of Contracts

Citations

Cited by:

1. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
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3. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March.
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5. Marcelo Bianconi, 2004. "Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Behavior of Individual Preferences under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0410, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
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9. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
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