Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
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- Qu, Yingge & Kumar, V. & Zhao, Yi, 2023. "A dynamic model of the contract length and early termination: The roles of technology evolution and pricing strategy," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
- Onjewu, Adah-Kole Emmanuel & Walton, Nigel & Koliousis, Ioannis, 2023. "Blockchain agency theory," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
- Keenan, Donald C. & Snow, Arthur, 2024. "Full downside risk aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 93-101.
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More about this item
Keywords
Risk-taking; contract theory; gaming;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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