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Delayed Privatization in Kosovo: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in the Ongoing Process

Author

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  • Isa Mulaj

    (Integra Consulting, Prishtina)

Abstract

In this paper we look at the specific features of the delayed privatization in Kosovo, emphasising in particular two stages: i) the events during 1990s, including the consequences of emergency measures, ii) the impact of an autonomous privatization in the early 1990s in a limited number of SOEs in the Gjakova region based on a survey of these enterprises, and iii) the critical assessment of the privatization proposals and the challenges in continuing the ongoing privatization process after the war.

Suggested Citation

  • Isa Mulaj, 2005. "Delayed Privatization in Kosovo: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in the Ongoing Process," Law and Economics 0511001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0511001
    Note: Type of Document - doc; pages: 40. Full reference: Mulaj, I. (2005), 'Delayed Privatization in Kosovo: Causes, Consequences, and Implications in the Ongoing Process', in Kusic, S. ed., Path-dependent Development in the Western Balkans: The Impact of Privatization, Peter Lang, Frankfurt, pp.123-163. ISBN: 3-631-53581-3 US-ISBN: 0-8204-7692-7
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/0511/0511001.doc
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mulaj, Isa, 2007. "Forgotten status of many: Kosovo's economy under the UN and the EU administration," Discourses in Social Market Economy 2007-08, OrdnungsPolitisches Portal (OPO).
    2. Mulaj, Isa, 2006. "Redefining Property Rights with Specific Reference to Social Ownership in Successor States of Former Yugoslavia: Did it Matter for Economic Efficiency?," MPRA Paper 243, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    SOEs; emergency measures; UNMIK; Kosovo Trust Agency; privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K - Law and Economics

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