Crescita, Innovazione Tecnologica e Mercato dei Capitali: il Ruolo del Venture Capital
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 50. Venture capital financing is essential in the presence of strong informational asymmetries that make more traditional forms of finance unavailable
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Josh Lerner, 1996. "The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Effects of the SBIR Program," NBER Working Papers 5753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Masahiko Aoki & Serdar Dinc, 1997. "Relational Financing as an Institution and its Viability under Competition," Working Papers 97011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998.
"Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 1-41.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1792, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," NBER Working Papers 5907, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1997. "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 321, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. "Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December.
- Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1996. "The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 463-498, October.
- Chan, Yuk-Shee & Siegel, Daniel R & Thakor, Anjan V, 1990. "Learning, Corporate Control and Performance Requirements in Venture Capital Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 365-381, May.
- Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & Luigi Zingales, "undated".
"Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis,"
CRSP working papers
330, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Pagano, Marco & Panetta, Fabio & Zingales, Luigi, 1996. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1332, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & Luigi Zingales, 1995. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 5367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fazzari, Steven M & Hubbard, R Glenn & Petersen, Bruce C, 1988. "Investment, Financing Decisions, and Tax Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 200-205, May.
- Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1984.
"Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 194-199, May.
- Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1984. "Informational Imperfections in the Capital Market and Macro-Economic Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 1335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
- Lerner, Josh, 1995. "Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 301-318, March.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-927, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994.
"A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:1:p:1-19 is not listed on IDEAS
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1989.
"Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1998. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 602, David K. Levine.
- Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
- Gompers, Paul A, 1995. "Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1461-1489, December.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, 1998. "Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation?," NBER Working Papers 6846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gompers, Paul A., 1998. "Venture capital growing pains: Should the market diet?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 1089-1104, August.
- Gompers, Paul A., 1996. "Grandstanding in the venture capital industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 133-156, September.
- Lerner, Joshua, 1994. "Venture capitalists and the decision to go public," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 293-316, June.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- N. Berger, Allen & F. Udell, Gregory, 1998.
"The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 613-673, August.
- Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-15, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Stein, Jeremy C., 2003.
"Agency, information and corporate investment,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 111-165,
Elsevier.
- Jeremy C. Stein, 2001. "Agency, Information and Corporate Investment," NBER Working Papers 8342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010.
"The Financing of R&D and Innovation,"
Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-639,
Elsevier.
- Bronwyn H. Hall & Josh Lerner, 2009. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," NBER Working Papers 15325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hall, Bronwyn H. & Lerner, Josh, 2010. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," MERIT Working Papers 2010-012, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
- Dessi, Roberta, 1999.
"Financing entrepreneurs: optimal contracts and the role of intermediaries,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
119120, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Roberta Dessí, 1999. "Financing Entrepreneurs: Optimal Contracts and the Role of Intermediaries," FMG Discussion Papers dp328, Financial Markets Group.
- Wang, Clement K. & Wang, Kangmao & Lu, Qing, 2003. "Effects of venture capitalists' participation in listed companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 2015-2034, October.
- Ali-Yrkkö, Jyrki & Hyytinen, Ari & Liukkonen, Johanna, 2001. "Exiting Venture Capital Investments: Lessons from Finland," Discussion Papers 781, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012.
"Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses,"
Factor Markets Working Papers
123, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses," Working papers 122846, Factor Markets, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Rin, Marco Da & Hellmann, Thomas & Puri, Manju, 2013.
"A Survey of Venture Capital Research,"
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 573-648,
Elsevier.
- Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. & Puri, M.L., 2011. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Other publications TiSEM eb956105-daa7-4a03-8392-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Marco Da Rin & Thomas F. Hellmann & Manju Puri, 2011. "A survey of venture capital research," NBER Working Papers 17523, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T. & Puri, M.L., 2011. "A Survey of Venture Capital Research," Discussion Paper 2011-111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Lerner, Joshua, 1998. ""Angel" financing and public policy: An overview," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 773-783, August.
- Schertler, Andrea & Stolpe, Michael, 2000. "Venture mania in Europe: Its causes and consequences," Kiel Discussion Papers 358, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 2001. "The Venture Capital Revolution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 145-168, Spring.
- Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, 2011.
"Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: a Survey,"
European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 17(4), pages 619-654, September.
- Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, 2010. "Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 16652, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Metrick, Andrew & Yasuda, Ayako, 2010. "Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey," Working Papers 11-06, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Sun, Yue & Uchida, Konari & Matsumoto, Mamoru, 2013. "The dark side of independent venture capitalists: Evidence from Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 279-300.
- Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin & Thomas Hellmann, 2004.
"Active Financial Intermediation: Evidence on the Role of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital,"
Working Papers
266, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Bottazzi, Laura & Da Rin, Marco & Hellmann, Thomas F, 2004. "Active Financial Intermediation: Evidence on the Role of Organizational Specialization and Human Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 4794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998.
"Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1997. "Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 1738, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 1997. "Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning," Other publications TiSEM d70119dd-1d85-4dde-9d59-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Ulrich Hege & Dirk Bergemann, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Post-Print hal-00481696, HAL.
- Sami Al-Suwailem, 1998. "Venture Capital: A Potential Model of Musharakah رأس المال المخاطر: نموذج محتمل للمشاركة," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., vol. 10(1), pages 20-30, January.
- Black, Bernard S. & Gilson, Ronald J., 1998. "Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 243-277, March.
- Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, 2012.
"Financing technology-based small firms in Europe: what do we know?,"
Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 179-205, July.
- Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, 2012. "Financing technology-based small firms in Europe: what do we know?," Post-Print halshs-00606802, HAL.
- Ting-Kai Chou & Jia-Chi Cheng & Chin-Chen Chien, 2013. "How useful is venture capital prestige? Evidence from IPO survivability," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 843-863, May.
- Jeppsson, Hans, 2018. "Initial public offerings, subscription precommitments and venture capital participation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 650-668.
More about this item
Keywords
Venture capital; asymmetric information; financing decision; ownership;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G - Financial Economics
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0404008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.