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Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment

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  • Bradler, Christiane
  • Dur, Robert
  • Neckermann, Susanne
  • Non, Arjan

Abstract

This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers. Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradler, Christiane & Dur, Robert & Neckermann, Susanne & Non, Arjan, 2013. "Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-017, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    employee motivation; recognition; reciprocity; conformity; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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