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Internal labour markets: a case study

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  • Francisco Lima

Abstract

We select one firm from a large data set of firms and study its internal economics. First we prove that the information available allows us to inspect the personnel policies of the firm. Furthermore, this fact allows moving from the case study to more comprehensive studies in personnel economics using institutional surveys. The analysis also shows the patterns of workers' promotions and the differences in the characteristics of insider versus outsider workers. The decision to promote is analyzed. The hierarchic design directly influences the wage policy. Wages are determined to a great extent by the layers of the hierarchy. There are wage premiums upon promotion, even if the worker does not change his place in the organization. When the promoted worker moves up in the hierarchy he comes from the top of the wage distribution at the old job and goes to the bottom of it in the new job. We present evidence on workers' exit and entry to the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in the lower part of the hierarchy.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Lima, 2000. "Internal labour markets: a case study," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp378, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp378
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-570, October.
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    10. Manove, Michael, 1997. "Job Responsibility, Pay and Promotion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(440), pages 85-103, January.
    11. McCue, Kristin, 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 175-209, April.
    12. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-466, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Blair Fix, 2022. "Economic development and the death of the free market," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-46, April.
    2. Fix, Blair, 2018. "The Trouble with Human Capital Theory," SocArXiv ax6k7, Center for Open Science.
    3. Fix, Blair, 2019. "How the Rich Are Different: Hierarchical Power as the Basis of Income Size and Class," SocArXiv t8muy, Center for Open Science.
    4. Fix, Blair, 2018. "Capitalist income and hierarchical power: A gradient hypothesis," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2018/06, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    5. Blair Fix, 2021. "How the rich are different: hierarchical power as the basis of income size and class," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 403-454, November.
    6. Fix, Blair, 2018. "The Growth of US Top Income Inequality: A Hierarchical Redistribution Hypothesis," SocArXiv suqnk, Center for Open Science.
    7. Fix, Blair, 2021. "Living the Good Life in a Non-Growth World. Investigating the Role of Hierarchy," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2021/02, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    8. Fix, Blair, 2019. "How the rich are different: Hierarchical power as the basis of income size and class," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2019/02 (v.2), Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    9. Fix, Blair, 2017. "Evidence for a Power Theory of Personal Income Distribution," SocArXiv qgwus, Center for Open Science.
    10. Fix, Blair, 2018. "Capitalist Income and Hierarchical Power," SocArXiv u8epv, Center for Open Science.
    11. Fix, Blair, 2017. "Evidence for a Power Theory of Personal Income Distribution," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2017/03, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    12. Fix, Blair, 2018. "The trouble with human capital theory," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2018/07, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    13. Fix, Blair, 2021. "Living the good life in a non-growth world: Investigating the role of hierarchy," SocArXiv wem9p, Center for Open Science.
    14. Fix, Blair, 2016. "Energy and Institution Size," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2016/04, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    15. Fix, Blair, 2019. "How the rich are different: Hierarchical power as the basis of income and class," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2019/02, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    16. Fix, Blair, 2018. "The growth of US top income inequality: A hierarchical redistribution hypothesis," Working Papers on Capital as Power 2018/05, Capital As Power - Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism.
    17. Fix, Blair, 2018. "The Trouble With Human Capital Theory," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue 86, pages 15-32.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internal labor market; personnel economics; hierarchy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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