IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/ecd1f718-05f7-43cd-b237-2f480498ab42.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Temporal Displacement of Environmental Crime : Evidence from Marine Oil Pollution

Author

Listed:
  • Vollaard, Ben

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

The probability of conviction commonly varies across different circumstances due to imperfect monitoring. Evidence of whether and how offenders exploit gaps in monitoring provides insight into the process by which deterrence is produced. We present an empirical test of temporal displacement of illegal discharges of oil from shipping, a major source of ocean pollution, in response to a monitoring technology that features variation in the probability of conviction by time of day. After sunset and before sunrise, evidence collected using airborne radar day-round becomes contestable in court because the nature of an identified spot cannot be verified visually. Using data from surveillance flights above the Dutch part of the North Sea during 1992-2011, we only find evidence for temporal displacement after 1999, with further tightening of the regulations. By that time, the overall level of discharges had been reduced considerably, making the observed temporal displacement relatively small in absolute levels.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Vollaard, Ben, 2015. "Temporal Displacement of Environmental Crime : Evidence from Marine Oil Pollution," Discussion Paper 2015-037, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:ecd1f718-05f7-43cd-b237-2f480498ab42
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/7366060/2015_037.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cohen, Mark A, 1987. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 23-51, April.
    2. Cohen, Mark A., 1986. "The costs and benefits of oil spill prevention and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
    3. David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, 2017. "The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence," Advances in Econometrics, in: Regression Discontinuity Designs, volume 38, pages 73-146, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    4. Knapp, Sabine & Franses, Philip Hans, 2009. "Does ratification matter and do major conventions improve safety and decrease pollution in shipping?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 826-846, September.
    5. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, 2014. "Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(4), pages 990-1030.
    6. Marc Keuschnigg & Tobias Wolbring, 2015. "Disorder, social capital, and norm violation: Three field experiments on the broken windows thesis," Rationality and Society, , vol. 27(1), pages 96-126, February.
    7. Brian Jacob & Lars Lefgren & Enrico Moretti, 2007. "The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior: Evidence from Weather Shocks," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 42(3).
    8. Esther Duflo & Michael Greenstone & Nicholas Ryan, 2013. "Truth-telling by Third-party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1499-1545.
    9. Apesteguia, Jose & Funk, Patricia & Iriberri, Nagore, 2013. "Promoting rule compliance in daily-life: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 266-284.
    10. Tyrefors Hinnerich, Björn & Palme, Mårten & Priks, Mikael, 2017. "Age-Dependent Court Sentences and Crime Bunching: Empirical Evidence from Swedish Administrative Data," Working Paper Series 1163, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    11. Pedro Bordalo & Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Salience and Consumer Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 803-843.
    12. Rigotti, N.A. & Bourne, D. & Rosen, A. & Locke, J.A. & Schelling, T.C., 1992. "Workplace compliance with a no-smoking law: A randomized community intervention trial," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 82(2), pages 229-235.
    13. Perez-Truglia, Ricardo & Troiano, Ugo, 2018. "Shaming tax delinquents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 120-137.
    14. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March.
    15. Amy Finkelstein, 2009. "E-ztax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(3), pages 969-1010.
    16. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, 2017. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 5-48, March.
    17. Hilary Sigman, 1998. "Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 157-178, Spring.
    18. Christian N. Brinch & Erik Hernæs & Zhiyang Jia, 2017. "Salience and Social Security Benefits," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 265-297.
    19. Epple, Dennis & Visscher, Michael, 1984. "Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 29-60, April.
    20. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    21. Raj Chetty & Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 2009. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1145-1177, September.
    22. King, Gary & Zeng, Langche, 2001. "Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 137-163, January.
    23. Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
    24. Kjetil Telle, 2012. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway," Discussion Papers 680, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    25. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    26. Dean Yang, 2008. "Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 1-14, February.
    27. Randi Hjalmarsson, 2008. "Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the Age of Criminal Majority," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 209-248.
    28. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    29. Telle, Kjetil, 2013. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 24-34.
    30. Montserrat Grau & Theodore Groves, 1997. "The Oil Spill Process: The Effect of Coast Guard Monitoring on Oil Spills," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(4), pages 315-339, December.
    31. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
    32. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    33. Daniel S. Nagin, 2013. "Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by a Criminologist for Economists," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 83-105, May.
    34. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
    35. Lu, Fangwen & Zhang, Jinan & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2016. "General and specific information in deterring traffic violations: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 97-107.
    36. Daniel Nettle & Kenneth Nott & Melissa Bateson, 2012. "‘Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You’: Impact of a Simple Signage Intervention against Bicycle Theft," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(12), pages 1-5, December.
    37. Joel Slemrod, 2019. "Tax Compliance and Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(4), pages 904-954, December.
    38. Robert Dur & Ben Vollaard, 2012. "The Power of a Bad Example - A Field Experiment in Household Garbage Disposal," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-061/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 10 Apr 2014.
    39. Johannes Rincke & Christian Traxler, 2011. "Enforcement Spillovers," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1224-1234, November.
    40. Michael D. Grubb, 2015. "Consumer Inattention and Bill-Shock Regulation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(1), pages 219-257.
    41. Hallsworth, Michael & List, John A. & Metcalfe, Robert D. & Vlaev, Ivo, 2017. "The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 14-31.
    42. Søren C. Winter & Peter J. May, 2001. "Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(4), pages 675-698.
    43. Michael Chirico & Robert Inman & Charles Loeffler & John MacDonald & Holger Sieg, 2016. "Deterring Delinquency: A Field Experiment in Improving Tax Compliance Behavior," Natural Field Experiments 00543, The Field Experiments Website.
    44. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 651-692, May.
    45. Justin McCrary, 2010. "Dynamic Perspectives on Crime," Chapters, in: Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    46. Nadja Dwenger & Henrik Kleven & Imran Rasul & Johannes Rincke, 2016. "Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 203-232, August.
    47. Rege, Mari & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1625-1644, July.
    48. Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on the Economics of Crime," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13180.
    49. Jay P. Shimshack, 2014. "The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 339-360, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Li, He & Lu, Juan, 2021. "Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    2. Kastoryano, Stephen & Vollaard, Ben, 2022. "Nautical Patrol and Illegal Fishing Practices," Discussion Paper 2022-016, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Stefano Castriota & Mirco Tonin, 2023. "Stay or flee? Hit-and-run accidents, darkness and probability of punishment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 117-144, February.
    4. Kastoryano, Stephen & Vollaard, Ben, 2023. "Unseen annihilation: Illegal fishing practices and nautical patrol," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    5. Jin, Peizhen & Wang, Siyu & Yin, Desheng & Zhang, Hang, 2023. "Environmental institutional supply that shapes a green economy: Evidence from Chinese cities," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    6. Browne, Oliver R. & Gazze, Ludovica & Greenstone, Michael & Olga Rostapshova, 2022. "Man vs. Machine : Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1440, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. Agarwal, Sumit & Han, Yajie & Qin, Yu & Zhu, Hongjia, 2023. "Disguised pollution: Industrial activities in the dark," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    8. Vikram Maheshri & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2018. "Do Security Measures Displace Crime? Theory and Evidence from Italian Bank Robberies," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 579, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    9. Pereira, Leila & Pucci, Rafael & Soares, Rodrigo R., 2024. "Landing on Water: Air Interdiction, Drug-Trafficking Displacement, and Violence in the Brazilian Amazon," IZA Discussion Papers 17425, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Zou, Eric, 2017. "Unwatched Pollution: The Effect of Incomplete Monitoring on Air Quality," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258274, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Gil, Ricard & Macis, Mario, 2015. ""Ain't No Rest for the Wicked": Population, Crime, and the 2013 Government Shutdown," IZA Discussion Papers 8864, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dur, Robert & Vollaard, Ben, 2019. "Salience of law enforcement: A field experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 208-220.
    2. Marcelo Bergolo & Rodrigo Ceni & Guillermo Cruces & Matias Giaccobasso & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2023. "Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 110-153, February.
    3. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
    4. Antinyan, Armenak & Asatryan, Zareh, 2019. "Nudging for tax compliance: A meta-analysis," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Castro, Juan Francisco & Velásquez, Daniel & Beltrán, Arlette & Yamada, Gustavo, 2022. "The direct and indirect effects of messages on tax compliance: Experimental evidence from Peru," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 483-518.
    6. Jan-Emmanuel De Neve & Clément Imbert & Johannes Spinnewijn & Teodora Tsankova & Maarten Luts, 2021. "How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(5), pages 1425-1463.
    7. Ninghua Du & Lingfang Li & Tian Lu & Xianghua Lu, 2020. "Prosocial Compliance in P2P Lending: A Natural Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 315-333, January.
    8. Kristina M. Bott & Alexander W. Cappelen & Erik Ø. Sørensen & Bertil Tungodden, 2020. "You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 2801-2819, July.
    9. Dina Pomeranz & José Vila-Belda, 2019. "Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 755-781, August.
    10. Joel Slemrod & Obeid Ur Rehman & Mazhar Waseem, 2022. "How Do Taxpayers Respond to Public Disclosure and Social Recognition Programs? Evidence from Pakistan," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 116-132, March.
    11. Biddle, Nicholas & Fels, Katja M. & Sinning, Mathias, 2018. "Behavioral insights on business taxation: Evidence from two natural field experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 30-49.
    12. Biddle, Nicholas & Fels, Katja & Sinning, Mathias, 2017. "Behavioral insights and business taxation: Evidence from two randomized controlled trials," Ruhr Economic Papers 698, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    13. Castro, Juan Francisco & Velásquez, Daniel & Beltrán, Arlette & Yamada, Gustavo, 2020. "Spillovers and Long-Run Effects of Messages on Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence from Peru," IZA Discussion Papers 13974, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Lopez-Luzuriaga, Andrea & Scartascini, Carlos, 2019. "Compliance spillovers across taxes: The role of penalties and detection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 518-534.
    15. Anne Brockmeyer & Spencer Smith & Marco Hernandez & Stewart Kettle, 2019. "Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-87, August.
    16. Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2022. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity - Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 44-86.
    17. Ortega, Daniel & Scartascini, Carlos, 2020. "Don’t blame the messenger. The Delivery method of a message matters," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 286-300.
    18. James Alm & Lilith Burgstaller & Arrita Domi & Amanda März & Matthias Kasper, 2023. "Nudges, Boosts, and Sludge: Using New Behavioral Approaches to Improve Tax Compliance," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-22, September.
    19. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    20. Belnap, Andrew & Welsch, Anthony & Williams, Braden, 2023. "Remote tax authority," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    deterrence; pollution; environmentel crime;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:ecd1f718-05f7-43cd-b237-2f480498ab42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.