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Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?

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  • Li, He
  • Lu, Juan

Abstract

Based on the day-night PM2.5 difference of the nearest atmospheric monitoring points to measure whether there is illegal emission, this paper explores the impact of environmental protection officials' tenure (EPLT) on illegal emissions. The results show that there is a positive correlation between EPLT and illegal emissions. Stable EPLT can reduce illegal emissions by increasing environmental information disclosure and environmental subsidies. It can increase illegal emissions by weakening public pollution reporting and media supervision, environmental law enforcement and promoting corruption. In addition, EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT is less than 3.55 years, while EPLT can increase illegal emissions as EPLT exceeds 6.21 years. Further, when mayor's tenure and EPLT are both stable, the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emission is stronger. Stable company director's tenure can also aggravate the promotion effect of EPLT on illegal emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, He & Lu, Juan, 2021. "Can stable environmental protection officials’ tenure reduce illegal emissions?," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceps:v:78:y:2021:i:c:s0038012121000471
    DOI: 10.1016/j.seps.2021.101055
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