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Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games

Author

Listed:
  • René van den Brink

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Chris Dietz

    (VU University Amsterdam)

  • Gerard van der Laan

    (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

  • Genjiu Xu

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, Shaanxi, P.R. China)

Abstract

There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson value is obtained by taking the Shapley value of the corresponding restricted game. For cycle-free connected graphs, Demange (2004) introduced for each player the corresponding hierarchical outcome, being the marginal contribution vector for a particular permutation of the player set induced by the graph. Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) introduced games with a (hierarchical) permission structure modeled by a directed graph on the set of players. In the conjunctive (disjunctive) approach, a coalition is said to be feasible, if for every player in the coalition also all (at least one of) its predecessors (if any) belong(s) to the coalition. The conjunctive (disjunctive) permission value is obtained by taking the Shapley value of the associated conjunctive (disjunctive) restricted game. The two approaches coincide when the permission structure is a rooted tree. In this paper we consider games with a hierarchical permission structure given by a rooted tree and modify the Myerson value to a value for such games. We also consider for these games the hierarchical outcome with respect to the root of the tree (top player), along with a new solution that assigns all payoff to the unique top player in the hierarchy. Then comparable characterizations are given of these three solutions and the (conjunctive) permission value.

Suggested Citation

  • René van den Brink & Chris Dietz & Gerard van der Laan & Genjiu Xu, 2015. "Comparable Characterizations of Four Solutions for Permission Tree Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-021/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman, 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 99-123, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Rajnish Kumar, 2019. "Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 155-188, December.
    2. David Lowing, 2023. "Allocation rules for multi-choice games with a permission tree structure," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 320(1), pages 261-291, January.
    3. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko, 2022. "Sharing sequentially triggered losses: Automatic conflict resolution through smart contracts," IFRO Working Paper 2020/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    4. Wenzhong Li & Genjiu Xu & Rong Zou & Dongshuang Hou, 2022. "The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 353-377, June.
    5. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2023. "Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 229-258, January.
    6. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2018. "The Tort Law and the Nucleolus for Generalized Joint Liability Problems," Discussion Papers 37, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    7. Rong Zou & Genjiu Xu & Wenzhong Li & Xunfeng Hu, 2020. "A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 735-758, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative TU-game; rooted tree; Myerson value; hierarchical outcome; permission value; axiomatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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