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Tree-connected Peer Group Situations and Peer Group Games

Author

Listed:
  • Brânzei, R.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Fragnelli, V.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

A class of cooperative games arising from economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is introduced. It is shown that the games in this class form a cone which lies in the intersection of convex games and monotonic veto-rich games with the leader of the organization as veto-player. Different economic situations like auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow situations are related to peer group games. For peer group games classical solution concepts have nice computational properties. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
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Suggested Citation

  • Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "Tree-connected Peer Group Situations and Peer Group Games," Other publications TiSEM 5b7e5664-1a44-4e09-9186-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:5b7e5664-1a44-4e09-9186-694e4c592b16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Borm, P.E.M. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1991. "Cooperation and communication restrictions : A survey," Other publications TiSEM 7d1c34fd-9403-4917-8b1a-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S.H., 2000. "On the computation of the nucleolus of line-graph peer group games," Other publications TiSEM fd889ce3-d034-47a2-9f6b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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