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The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility

Author

Listed:
  • Wenzhong Li

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Genjiu Xu

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Rong Zou

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

  • Dongshuang Hou

    (Northwestern Polytechnical University)

Abstract

Marginal contribution is a significant index to measure every player’s ability to cooperate in cooperative games. Several solutions for cooperative games are defined in terms of marginal contribution, including the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. In this paper, we introduce marginal surplus as an alternative index to describe the contribution level of every player. We define a new solution for cooperative games, namely the average-surplus value, which is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing marginal surplus. Then we characterize the average-surplus value by introducing the A-null surplus player property and the revised balanced contributions property. We also propose the AS-potential function to implement the average-surplus value. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative game, the outcome of which coincides with the average-surplus value in subgame perfect equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenzhong Li & Genjiu Xu & Rong Zou & Dongshuang Hou, 2022. "The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 353-377, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:51:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00795-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00795-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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