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A Mean-Field Game of Market Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Guanxing Fu

    (Hong Kong Polytechnic University)

  • Paul Hager

    (University of Vienna)

  • Ulrich Horst

    (Humboldt University Berlin)

Abstract

We consider both N-player and mean-field games of optimal portfolio liquidation in which the players are not allowed to change the direction of trading. Players with an initially short position of stocks are only allowed to buy while players with an initially long position are only allowed to sell the stock. Under suitable conditions on the model parameters we show that the games are equivalent to games of timing where the players need to determine the optimal times of market entry and exit. We identify the equilibrium entry and exit times and prove that equilibrium mean-trading rates can be characterized in terms of the solutions to a highly non-linear higher-order integral equation with endogenous terminal condition. We prove the existence of a unique solution to the integral equation from which we obtain the existence of a unique equilibrium both in the mean-field and the N-player game.

Suggested Citation

  • Guanxing Fu & Paul Hager & Ulrich Horst, 2024. "A Mean-Field Game of Market Entry," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 517, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:517
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    portfolio liquidation; mean-field game; Nash equilibrium; trading constraint; non-linear integral equations;
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