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The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: A mean-field game approach

Author

Listed:
  • René Aïd

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Roxana Dumitrescu

    (Department of Mathematics [London] - King‘s College London)

  • Peter Tankov

    (ENSAE - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique)

Abstract

We develop a model for the industry dynamics in the electricity market, based on mean-field games of optimal stopping. In our model, there are two types of agents: the renewable producers and the conventional producers. The renewable producers choose the optimal moment to build new renewable plants, and the conventional producers choose the optimal moment to exit the market. The agents interact through the market price, determined by matching the aggregate supply of the two types of producers with an exogenous demand function. Using a relaxed formulation of optimal stopping mean-field games, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the equilibrium price process. An empirical example, inspired by the UK electricity market is presented. The example shows that while renewable subsidies clearly lead to higher renewable penetration, this may entail a cost to the consumer in terms of higher peakload prices. In order to avoid rising prices, the renewable subsidies must be combined with mechanisms ensuring that sufficient conventional capacity remains in place to meet the energy demand during peak periods.

Suggested Citation

  • René Aïd & Roxana Dumitrescu & Peter Tankov, 2021. "The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: A mean-field game approach," Post-Print hal-03215763, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03215763
    DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2021012
    as

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Masaaki Fujii, 2022. "Equilibrium Pricing of Securities in the Co-Presence of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Populations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Masaaki Fujii, 2023. "Equilibrium pricing of securities in the co-presence of cooperative and non-cooperative populations (Forthcoming in ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations) (Revised version of CARF-F-," CARF F-Series CARF-F-562, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    3. Jens Hönen & Johann L. Hurink & Bert Zwart, 2023. "A classification scheme for local energy trading," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 45(1), pages 85-118, March.
    4. Guanxing Fu & Paul P. Hager & Ulrich Horst, 2024. "A Mean-Field Game of Market Entry: Portfolio Liquidation with Trading Constraints," Papers 2403.10441, arXiv.org.
    5. Masaaki Fujii, 2022. "Equilibrium pricing of securities in the co-presence of cooperative and non-cooperative populations," Papers 2209.12639, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.

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