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A two-player portfolio tracking game

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  • Moritz Vo{ss}

Abstract

We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank, Soner, Vo{\ss} (2017). Specifically, both agents track their own stochastic running trading targets while interacting through common aggregated temporary and permanent price impact \`a la Almgren and Chriss (2001). The resulting stochastic linear quadratic differential game with terminal state constraints allows for a unique and explicitly available open-loop Nash equilibrium. Our results reveal how the equilibrium strategies of the two players take into account the other agent's trading targets: either in an exploitative intent or by providing liquidity to the competitor, depending on the relation between temporary and permanent price impact. As a consequence, different behavioral patterns can emerge as optimal in equilibrium. These insights complement and extend existing studies in the literature on predatory trading models examined in the context of optimal portfolio liquidation games.

Suggested Citation

  • Moritz Vo{ss}, 2019. "A two-player portfolio tracking game," Papers 1911.05122, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1911.05122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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