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Inside the black box of collective reputation

Author

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  • Stefano Castriota
  • Marco Delmastro

Abstract

The literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy. Despite the existence of a (limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation building, there is still no comprehensive analysis of this concept. In addition, due to data limitation, there are no empirical studies testing the determinants of group reputation. This work intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of reputational equilibria within coalitions of agents. In order to do so, we design a static and dynamic (over 30 years) study on the universe of coalitions of companies, within the wine market, looking at the role exerted by the characteristics of the coalition itself (its age and size), the rules set and the actions put forward by the group of agents in order to reach and maintain a certain level of collective reputation, and the context in which they operate. Results shed new lights into this ubiquitous phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2011. "Inside the black box of collective reputation," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 89/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
    • Handle: RePEc:pia:wpaper:89/2011
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    File URL: http://www2.ec.unipg.it/quaderni/qd_89web.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:4:p:431-56 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fiona M. Scott Morton & Joel M. Podolny, 2002. "Love or Money? The Effects of Owner Motivation in the California Wine Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 431-456, December.
    3. Raphaël Soubeyran & Elodie Rouvière, 2008. "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard," Working Papers 2008.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
    5. Rouviere, Elodie & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2008. "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 6325, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Venturini, 2011. "Product variety, product quality, and evidence of Schumpeterian endogenous growth: a note," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 93/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    reputation; collective reputation; asymmetric information; quality standards; wine.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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