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Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market

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  • Stefano Castriota
  • Marco Delmastro

Abstract

The concept of reputation has been used in every field of economic research, given its capacity to affect the outcome of all economic and financial transactions. The theoretical debate on reputation is very rich, but the mechanisms of reputation building have not been explored enough from the empirical viewpoint. In this paper we investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into consideration the interactions between individual and collective reputation. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide robust evidence on the determinants of firm reputation using a large set of controls applied to a database not affected by self-selection bias. In fact, we constructed a new database containing the "universe" of wineries located in four regions of the North-West of Italy with an established national reputation and focus on the determinants of the «jump» from national to international reputation. Our research confirms the prediction of the theoretical literature and shows the positive effect of firm age, size, investments and producer's intrinsic motivations, and of collective reputation on individual firm reputation. Cooperatives seem to decrease their reputation when the number of associated members rises, due to free-riding and traceability problems. In contrast with previous research, relying on well-known external consultants does not acquire any outside reputation. Finally, by comparing the regression results on the determinants of national and international reputation it emerges the relevance of the mechanisms of the evaluation process: the higher proximity to the wineries of a national observer permits a better and more technical knowledge of the quality provided, allowing small "niche" producers with very low productivity to emerge and be known. For the same reason, the national classification system (i.e. the DOCG system) exerts a significant effect only on the international reputation of wineries, but not on the national one where the effect of collective reputation (i.e. the reputation of single denominations like Barolo) seems to prevail.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Castriota & Marco Delmastro, 2010. "Individual and Collective Reputation: Lessons from the Wine Market," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 149-172.
  • Handle: RePEc:mul:j0hje1:doi:10.1430/31867:y:2010:i:1:p:149-172
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    Cited by:

    1. Fishman, Arthur & Finkelshtain, Israel & Simhon, Avi & Yacouel, Nira, 2008. "The Economics of Collective Brands," Discussion Papers 46056, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
    2. Alexander E. Saak, 2012. "Collective Reputation, Social Norms, and Participation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(3), pages 763-785.
    3. Yanying Chen & Liang Ping & Feng Helen Liang, 2023. "Industry Reputation Crisis and Firm Certification: A Co-evolution Perspective," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 186(4), pages 761-780, September.
    4. Bailet, Isabelle & Diotallevi, Francesco & Marchini, Andrea, 2010. "Determinant factors in reputation of wines:analysis of wine production in Central Italy," MPRA Paper 40635, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kolavalli, Shashidhara & Birner, Regina & Flaherty, Kathleen, 2012. "The comprehensive Africa agriculture program as a collective institution:," IFPRI discussion papers 1238, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    6. Zago, Angelo, 2015. "La réputation collective sur les marchés agricoles," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 345(January-F).
    7. Grazia Calabrò & Simone Vieri, 2016. "The Food and Wine Tourism: A Resource for a New Local Development Model," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 18(S10), pages 988-988, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation; Credibility; Asymmetric Information; Quality Standards; Wine; Denominations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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