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Nudging the Nudger: Performance Feedback and Organ Donor Registrations

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Listed:
  • Julian House
  • Nicola Lacetera
  • Mario Macis
  • Nina Mazar

Abstract

In a randomized controlled trial (RCT) conducted in three waves over 2.5 years and involving nearly 700 customer-service representatives (CSRs) from a Canadian government service agency, we studied how providing CSRs with repeated performance feedback, with or without peer comparison, affected their subsequent organ donor registration rates. The feedback resulted in a 25% increase in daily signups compared to otherwise equivalent encouragements and reminders. Adding benchmark information about peer performance did not amplify or diminish this effect. We observed increased registration rates for both high and low performers. A post-intervention survey indicates that CSRs in all conditions found the information included in the treatments helpful and motivating and that signing up organ donors makes their job more meaningful. We also found suggestive evidence that performance feedback with benchmark information was the most motivating and created the least pressure to perform.

Suggested Citation

  • Julian House & Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis & Nina Mazar, 2022. "Nudging the Nudger: Performance Feedback and Organ Donor Registrations," NBER Working Papers 30547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30547
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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