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Teacher quality and incentives - Theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality

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  • Jürges, Hendrik
  • Wolfram F., Richter
  • Kerstin, Schneider

    (Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA))

Abstract

Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show that it is optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking because it raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers’ pay (defined in monetary terms) is not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching output is measured so that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The theory is tested using the German PISA-E data. Use is made of the fact that central exams exist in some federal states of Germany but not in all. The empirical evidence suggests that central exams have a positive effect on the quality of teaching.

Suggested Citation

  • Jürges, Hendrik & Wolfram F., Richter & Kerstin, Schneider, 2005. "Teacher quality and incentives - Theoretical and empirical effects of standards on teacher quality," MEA discussion paper series 05091, Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:mea:meawpa:05091
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fertig, Michael, 2004. "What Can We Learn From International Student Performance Studies? Some Methodological Remarks," RWI Discussion Papers 23, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    2. Jaag, Christian, 2006. "Teacher Incentives," MPRA Paper 340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2008. "Fair ranking of teachers," Studies in Empirical Economics, in: Christian Dustmann & Bernd Fitzenberger & Stephen Machin (ed.), The Economics of Education and Training, pages 157-177, Springer.
    4. Piopiunik, Marc & Schwerdt, Guido & Woessmann, Ludger, 2013. "Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 93-108.
    5. Oliver Himmler & Robert Schwager, 2013. "Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(2), pages 166-189, May.
    6. Ludger Wößmann, 2006. "Bildungspolitische Lehren aus den internationalen Schülertests: Wettbewerb, Autonomie und externe Leistungsüberprüfung," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 417-444, August.
    7. Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Grade inflation, social background, and labour market matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 56-66.
    8. Woessmann Ludger, 2010. "Institutional Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 230(2), pages 234-270, April.
    9. Hendrik Jürges & Kerstin Schneider, 2010. "Central exit examinations increase performance... but take the fun out of mathematics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 497-517, March.
    10. Oliver Himmler & Robert Schwager, 2013. "Double Standards in Educational Standards – Do Schools with a Disadvantaged Student Body Grade More Leniently?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(2), pages 166-189, May.
    11. Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2022. "Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    12. Benedikt Langner & Jochen Siller, 2008. "Institutionelle Anreizfaktoren im deutschen Schulsystem: Status quo und Reformoptionen am Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2008, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    13. Ludger Woessmann, 2007. "Fundamental Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 1981, CESifo.
    14. Ludger Wößmann, 2005. "Leistungsfördernde Anreize für das Schulsystem," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 58(19), pages 18-27, October.
    15. repec:zbw:rwidps:0023 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Yi, Pilnam & Kim, Hye Jeong, 2019. "Exploring the relationship between external and internal accountability in education: A cross-country analysis with multi-level structural equation modeling," International Journal of Educational Development, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 1-9.
    17. Jürges, Hendrik & Schneider, Kerstin & Senkbeil, Martin & Carstensen, Claus H., 2012. "Assessment drives learning: The effect of central exit exams on curricular knowledge and mathematical literacy," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 56-65.
    18. Wößmann, Ludger, 2008. "Zentrale Abschlussprüfungen und Schülerleistungen. Individualanalysen anhand von vier internationalen Tests," Munich Reprints in Economics 19668, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    19. Michael Fertig, 2004. "What Can We Learn From International Student Performance Studies? Some Methodological Remarks," RWI Discussion Papers 0023, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    20. Robert Schwager, 2005. "PISA‐Schock und Hochschulmisere – Hat der deutsche Bildungsföderalismus versagt?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(2), pages 189-205, May.
    21. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Hideo Kozumi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009. "Does yardstick regulation really work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 308-323, December.

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    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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