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Incentives for Schools, Educational Signals and Labour Market Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)

  • Stephan Veen

    (Department of Business Administrations, University of Zurich)

Abstract

Central exams have been discussed as an incentive to improve educational outcomes. In our paper we study the impact of central exams on labor market outcomes. We explain the quality choice of schools under central and non-central exams and model the resulting students' schooling decisions and employers' wage decisions. We use the German Abitur and the variation among the German federal states with respect to central exams as a quasi experimental design. We expect the ratio of Abitur holders to increase in states without central exams and their wage premiums to decrease at the same time. In states with central exams these effects should not occur. We test our implications with official statistics on education and with the GSOEP. The first two implications are born out in the data. Finally, explanations and policy recommendations are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner & Stephan Veen, 2006. "Incentives for Schools, Educational Signals and Labour Market Outcomes," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0009, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), revised Jun 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:iso:educat:0009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Steve Bradley & Giuseppe Migali, 2012. "The direct and indirect effects of education policy on school and post school outcomes," Working Papers 24958831, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    2. Florian Birkenfeld, 2008. "What makes up a central exit examination?," Working Papers 065, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education Economics; School choice; Incentives for Schools; Central Exams; Economic impact; Labor Market Outcome;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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