IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp6284.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Who Benefits from Benefits? Empirical Research on Tangible Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Hammermann, Andrea

    (RWTH Aachen University)

  • Mohnen, Alwine

    (Munich University of Technology)

Abstract

Although a broad field of literature on incentive theory exists, employer-provided tangible goods (hereafter called benefits) have so far been neglected by economic research. A remarkable exception is an empirical study by Oyer (2008). In our study, we test some of his findings by drawing on a German data set. We use two waves of the GSOEP data (2006, 2008) to analyze the occurrence of benefits and their effects on employees' satisfaction. Our results provide evidence for economic as well as psychological explanations. Looking at differences in firms' and employees' characteristics we find that cost efficiency concerns, the purpose to signal good working conditions and the aim to ease employees' effort costs are evident reasons to provide benefits. Furthermore, analyzing the impact of tangible and monetary incentives on satisfaction and employees' feeling of being acknowledged by employers, we find different motivational effects. Our results support the psychological explanation that benefits are evaluated separately from other monetary wage components and are more likely to express employers' concern for their employees and recognition of their performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Hammermann, Andrea & Mohnen, Alwine, 2012. "Who Benefits from Benefits? Empirical Research on Tangible Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 6284, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6284
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp6284.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Wulf, Julie, 2006. "Are perks purely managerial excess?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-33, January.
    2. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    3. Sebastian Kube & Michel André Maréchal & Clemens Puppe, 2013. "Do Wage Cuts Damage Work Morale? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 853-870, August.
    4. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1999. "Changing Inequality in Markets for Workplace Amenities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(4), pages 1085-1123.
    5. Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2008. "Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 565-585, June.
    6. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
    7. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    8. Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2009. "Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 592-612, March.
    9. Cornelissen, Thomas & Heywood, John S. & Jirjahn, Uwe, 2011. "Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 229-239, April.
    10. Prendergast, Canice & Stole, Lars, 2001. "The non-monetary nature of gifts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1793-1810, December.
    11. Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Reference-Dependent Preferences and the Impact of Wage Increases on Job Satisfaction: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(2), pages 313-335, June.
    12. Sebastian Kube & Michel Andre Marechal & Clemens Puppe, 2012. "The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1644-1662, June.
    13. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Constant, Amelie F. & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2003. "Occupational Choice Across Generations," IZA Discussion Papers 975, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2007. "Paying Respect," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 135-150, Fall.
    16. Jennifer C. Smith, 2015. "Pay Growth, Fairness, and Job Satisfaction: Implications for Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 852-877, July.
    17. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Simone N. Tuor, 2010. "Avoiding Labor Shortages by Employer Signaling: On the Importance of Good Work Climate and Labor Relations," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(2), pages 271-286, January.
    18. Wölfel, Oliver & Heineck, Guido, 2012. "Parental risk attitudes and children's secondary school track choice," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 727-743.
    19. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2010. "Do all material incentives for pro-social activities backfire? The response to cash and non-cash incentives for blood donations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 738-748, August.
    20. Bewley, Truman, 2004. "Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity," IZA Discussion Papers 1137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Oyer, Paul, 2004. "Salary or Benefits?," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8xs3k3j8, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    23. Paul Oyer, 2008. "Salary or benefits?," Research in Labor Economics, in: Work, Earnings and Other Aspects of the Employment Relation, pages 429-467, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    24. Elke Holst & Anne Busch, 2009. "Der "Gender Pay Gap" in Führungspositionen der Privatwirtschaft in Deutschland," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 169, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    25. Michael D. Grubb & Paul Oyer, 2008. "Who Benefits from Tax-Advantaged Employee Benefits?: Evidence from University Parking," NBER Working Papers 14062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hammermann, Andrea & Mohnen, Alwine, 2014. "The pric(z)e of hard work," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-15.
    2. Sebastian Kube & Michel Andre Marechal & Clemens Puppe, 2012. "The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1644-1662, June.
    3. Sliwka, Dirk & Werner, Peter, 2016. "How Do Agents React to Dynamic Wage Increases? An Experimental Study," IZA Discussion Papers 9855, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Hanna M. Sittenthaler & Alwine Mohnen, 2020. "Cash, non-cash, or mix? Gender matters! The impact of monetary, non-monetary, and mixed incentives on performance," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(8), pages 1253-1284, September.
    5. Viswanathan, Madhu & Li, Xiaolin & John, George & Narasimhan, Om, 2018. "Is cash king for sales compensation plans? Evidence from a large-scale field intervention," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87158, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Christiane Bradler & Robert Dur & Susanne Neckermann & Arjan Non, 2013. "Employee Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-038/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Diriwaechter, Patric & Shvartsman, Elena, 2018. "The anticipation and adaptation effects of intra- and interpersonal wage changes on job satisfaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 116-140.
    8. Dohmen, Thomas, 2014. "Behavioral labor economics: Advances and future directions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 71-85.
    9. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    10. Kvaløy, Ola & Schöttner, Anja, 2015. "Incentives to motivate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 26-42.
    11. Adithipyangkul, Pattarin, 2012. "Non-cash compensation with production externalities and agency problems related to an agent’s consumption choice," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 110-120.
    12. Emmanuelle Auriol & Régis Renault, 2008. "Status and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 305-326, March.
    13. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
    14. Tor Eriksson & Nicolai Kristensen, 2014. "Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-Offs and Sorting," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(4), pages 899-928.
    15. Hua Zhang & Yuanyang Song & Yuan Ding, 2015. "What Drives Managerial Perks? An Empirical Test of Competing Theoretical Perspectives," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(2), pages 259-275, December.
    16. Pattarin Adithipyangkul & Ilan Alon & Tianyu Zhang, 2011. "Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 401-425, June.
    17. Weinschenk, Philipp, 2013. "Compensation, perks, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 67-70.
    18. Sauermann, Jan, 2015. "Worker Reciprocity and the Returns to Training: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 9179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Alessandro Fedele & Luca Panaccione, 2020. "Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 223-241, July.
    20. Simon G�chter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Fairness in the Labour Market � A Survey of Experimental Results," IEW - Working Papers 114, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    benefits; nonmonetary incentives; work motivation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6284. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.